APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110008-5
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Klement Gottwald
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Antonin Novotny
process of transition to communism. The charter changed the name of the country to Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and provided for far-reaching administrative changes designed to support the principle of strong centralized rule. In addition to its more mundane objectives, the document was clearly intended to serve as an eloquent testimonial to the success and wisdom of Novotny's domestic policies. But such self-congratulations was a bit premature. In fact, Novotny's outmoded Stalinist system was already beginning to break down.
Over the years, Novotny's policies had alienated most of his countrymen nd had even created divisions—albeit for the most part well concealed—within the party itself. The Slovaks, chafing under their total subordination to a Czech-dominated regime in Prague, were particularly unhappy. Moreover, popular discontent, while rarely openly expressed, had quickly found reflection in various forms of passive resistance which not only exacerbated the shortcomings inherent in Czechoslovak's straitjacketed economy, but undermined the effectiveness of Novotny's political programs as well.
In late 1962, mounting economic troubles and Khrushchev's renewed assault on Stalinism brought matters to a head. Reformist forces inside and outside the party began to agitate openly for the sort of liberalization that had been undertaken throughout most of the rest of Communist Eastern Europe many years earlier. Faced with new economic reverses in 1963, Novotny was forced to modify his policies and sanction a gradual relaxation of controls. Once begun, however, liberalization developed a momentum of its own. Longstanding differences between party liberals and conservatives broke out into the open, frequently impeding the formulation or implementation of policies needed to deal with pressing economic and social problems. Novotny's efforts to establish and maintain a delicate balance between these factions only increased the levels of party discord and official inertia. By late 1967, Novotny was clearly losing control of the situation, and a full-blown party crisis ensued.
Sensing Novotny's vulnerability, a group of Slovak leaders led by Alexander Dubcek precipitated the crisis during an October meeting of the Party Central Committee by boldly criticizing him and his inefficient Czech-dominated administration and by suggesting that the time had come for collective leadership. Although a number of Czech leaders who also favored a change at the helm soon joined in these personal attacks on the previously sacrosanct Novotny, he managed to postpone discussion of the leadership question for a number of weeks in hopes of improving
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110008-5
