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the country. He enjoyed a measure of popular support in Slovakia, and worked diligently against Czech opposition to engineer a meaningful federal program. The effort seemed doomed to defeat, but, ironically, was revived by the invasion, which gave Husak considerable leverage in asserting Slovak claims because it was widely opposed the Soviets were opposed to them. Even after the federalization law was passed and partly implemented, however, the uncertain vacillation between strong central authority and federalism continued. When Husak became First Secretary, in April 1969, he felt obliged to dismantle some of the federal alterations in the government structure already put into effect. A multitude of problems had been encountered in transferring legislative and executive powers from the central government to the separate republics. The diminished authority of Prague threatened to disrupt the social and political administration of the country; Husak's efforts to assert absolute control were commensurately compromised. As a result, federalization became a serious liability to a government whose first obligation was to reestablish political stability throughout the country. The regime gradually transferred much of the regional authority back to national government institutions, and in December 1970 the Federal Assembly amended the federalization law to once again permit essential direction from Prague.
This trend toward recentralization in practice while retaining the outward institutional forms of federalization has continued through 1973, and includes the effective reimposition of central controls over mass organizations, such as the trade unions, by means of newly created coordinating executive organs on the federal level.
The public's assessment of the constitution is realistic; given the fact of the Communist Party's monopoly of power, the Czechoslovak Government is one of men, not laws. In this context, no written document, even if it contained legal constraints on governmental power—which the Czechoslovak constitution does not—can be viewed as providing a genuine recourse to the citizenry against an abuse of power by their rulers.
2. Legislative and executive functions
a. Central government
Although separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government are delineated in the constitution, no actual separation of powers has existed under the Communists. Until for the period of Dubcek's incumbency, there were constant efforts to concentrate as much power as possible in the hands of a few Communist leaders. The legislative body, the National Assembly, was in practice a tool of the executive branch. In turn, many leaders of the executive branch often simultaneously held leadership positions in the Communist Party. This interrelationship between party and government leadership was personified by Antonin Novotny, who functioned as both First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and as President of the Republic between 1957 and January 1968. The numerous interlocking party and government positions enabled the party hierarchy easily to dominate the state apparatus.
In 1968 the Dubcek leadership initiated an extensive reorganization of the government, which eventually would have been spelled out in a new constitution. The new plan separated and defined executive, legislative, and judicial responsibilities, and provided for the effective delegation of powers by the party, which would then withdraw from its ubiquitous role in the governmental process. In particular, no longer would leading party officials have been permitted to assume top positions in the governmental hierarchy.
The only major constitutional reform to survive the downfall of the Dubcek regime was the federalization of the country. Approved by the U.S.S.R., the federal law invested in the Czech and Slovak republics much of the executive power previously held by the central government, and provided for equal representation between the two nations in all remaining central government bodies. The premiers of the Czech and Slovak national governments automatically became deputy premiers of the federal government. Enforcement powers for laws enacted by individual republics as well as many federal laws were given to the separate republics. Areas limited solely to federal jurisdiction were foreign policy, national defense, and "materiel reserves" (strategic resources). Executive functions under joint jurisdiction of the federal and two national governments included finance, prices, agriculture, transportation, communications, labor, internal security, and the mass media. In addition to the federal budget, each of the national governments was empowered to draw up its own budget.
Legislative powers, on the other hand, were left largely in the hands of the federal government, but both national administrations were given veto power in the federal legislature in such important matters as the federal budget, the distribution of revenues between the federation and national states, taxation, police affairs, and information media. Regional legislation was envisaged concerning civil and penal law, education, and conservation.
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