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regime largely offset these reforms, however, by increasing the role of the party in initiating and guiding legislation. The Party Central Committee established commissions to direct policy implementation in the realms of ideology, the economy, standard of living, law, and agriculture. These commissions, chaired by members of the party hierarchy, were responsible only to the Party Central Committee and the Party Presidium; they had the power to dictate to the governmental ministries concerned as well as to the National Assembly and its committees. In addition, there was a party organization parallel to, if not actually in, almost every government component to insure continuous party control.

Dubcek's Action Program directed the National Assembly to assume its constitutional role as the "supreme organ of state power" and to "really decide on laws and important political questions." Party organs were no longer to do the work of state bodies, thus removing the party's omnipresence in governmental affairs. These reforms were abandoned in the wake of the invasion.

Under the Husak regime, the Federal Assembly has again been subjugated to the pre-Dubcek system of party controls. Senior members of the Communist Party, including Husak himself, now sit on the Federal Assembly Presidium. Legislative initiative again rests with Party Central Committee commissions and departments.

(2) Presidency — In contrast to the constitutions of most other Communist countries, the Czechoslovak document provides for the position of a President of the Republic exercising real executive functions. This holdover from the 1920 constitution is in large part explained by the prestige originally attached to the office by the popularity of the first "President-Liberator," Tomas G. Masaryk. Under the 1960 constitution, which was tailored to fit party boss Novotny, the President is assigned executive functions as Chief of State, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and representative of the state in all international dealings. He also exercises powers such as the appointment and recall of the Premier, cabinet members, all ranking government officials, and diplomatic representatives. While Novotny exercised these theoretical constitutional powers, his real authority as President flowed from his paramount role as Communist Party First Secretary. The President is elected by a three-fifths majority of the Federal Assembly sitting in joint session. His term of office is 5 years.

It was the intention of the Dubcek government to divest the Presidency of the nearly limitless powers formerly associated with the office, while retaining its ceremonial eminence. Ludvik Svoboda, who replaced Novotny as Chief of State in May 1968, was elected with the tacit understanding that he would be an interim, rubberstamp President (Figure 5). His widespread popularity based on his wartime exploits, along with his courage in standing up to the Soviets before and after the invasion, also served the interests of the Husak regime, which had no other figure with which the public could identify. Svoboda's image has subsequently been tarnished, however, because of his close association with the Husak regime and almost total acquiescence to Soviet demands. Some dissidents, in fact, have blamed the aged (78 in 1973) general for having begun the postinvasion "dialog" with the Soviets, and thus allegedly compromising if not negating the possibility of active resistance to the occupation.

As the expiration of Svoboda's 5-year term (on 30 March 1973) came closer, a great deal of speculation emerged concerning his successor, and the impact this would have on the political configuration of the party leadership itself. Though in failing health—mainly senility—and anxious to step aside, Svoboda was reelected to the Presidency. Indeed, as a consistent supporter to party chief Husak's political line, Svoboda reportedly was persuaded by Husak himself to accept the post to prevent a reshuffling of the hierarchy in favor of the hardline elements over Husak's moderate/conservative supporters.

Given Svoboda's ill-health and advanced age, the regime realizes the problem of presidential succession and its impact has been only postponed. One consideration bearing on the selection of the next President will be his nationality; no Slovak has ever held that post and many may think that after Svoboda

FIGURE 5. President of the Republic Ludvik Svoboda (C)

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