Ackermann J
reasonably possible to construe a statute in such a way that it does not give rise to constitutional inconsistency, such a construction should be preferred to another construction which, although also reasonable, would give rise to such inconsistency.[1] Such a construction is not a reasonable one, however, when it can be reached only by distorting the meaning of the expression being considered.
- ↑ De Lange v Smuts NO and Others 1998 (7) BCLR 779 (CC); 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) at para 85 and Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others NNO 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC); 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at para 59 and the authorities cited in footnotes 85 and 87.
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