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The central controller correctly instructed all trains in the immediate area of the accident to stop and remain standing. Supervisors or company officials should not take it upon themselves to countermand the controller's orders except in extreme emergencies and then, if it is not possible to check with him before the move, notify him as quickly as possible. Otherwise the controller loses control of the situation. Vibrations from the movement of the southbound train past the location of the derailed cars could have caused the some of the remaining cars which were unstable to dislodge and fall from the structure. Under different circumstances, rescue personnel or confused passengers might have been struck.
CONCLUSIONS
Findings
1, There were no mechanical or electrical defects in the equipment of either train that would have contributed to the accident.
2. The ATC equipment and the brake systems on the Lake-Dan Ryan train were operating properly.
3. Proper cab signal aspects were displayed to all trains for the corresponding track occupancy conditions in the vicinity of the accident on February 4, 1977.
4. The rear car of the Ravenswood train was standing in the curve at the time of impact, and it could have been seen by the motorman of the Lake-Dan Ryan train as it approached from the Randolph Street Station.
5. The motorman of the Lake-Dan Ryan train should have been able to stop the train before the collision if he saw the Ravenswood train at the point where he claimed to have first seen the train.
6. The overturning movement of the cars was a result of lateral force components which resulted from the cars' positions on the curve.
7. Propulsion power was probably being applied either at the time of impact or immediately thereafter.
8. A more extensive study of the motorman's service record may have initiated action that would have prevented this accident.
9. The lack of systematic review of the operating rules and procedures is a factor in the confusion about the rules exhibited by CTA employees.
