(10) The airport lighting system, which included high intensity approach lights, sequence flashers, and high intensity runway lights, was in operation and properly set at the time of the accident.
(11) The minima for this approach (minimum descent altitude of 1,240 feet m.s.l. and minimum visibility of 1 mile) were the same as those prescribed for any nonscheduled flight into Huntington. These minima were adequate for the intended operation.
(12) The weather reported at the field at the time of the accident was 300 feet scattered, measured 500 feet variable broken ceiling, 1100 feet overcast, visibility 5 miles in light rain, fog, and smoke; however, the weather in the approach area was worse.
(13) The investigation disclosed no malfunction or failure in the aircraft structure, primary flight controls, or powerplants.
(14) There was no physical evidence of a defect or contamination in the static system tubing or parts; a static system error is extremely unlikely unless there was an offsetting error in the pitot system.
(15) The captain was using the autopilot throughout the approach and there was no evidence of a significant autopilot malfunction.
(16) Based on the recorded cockpit conversation, the crew was familiar with the approach procedures at Huntington and with the MDA on the approach being flown.
(17) The crew deviated from the optimal approach procedures in several respects; however, the effect of this deviation on the accident cannot be assessed inasmuch as the cockpit conversation indicated the crew had altitude awareness.
(18) The flight descended through the MDA of 1,240 feet m.s.1. approximately 2 miles from the end of the runway and the descent continued for over 300 feet before the crew initiated a missed approach or go-around.
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