With regard to the Administrator's response to our recommendation that he reevaluate his position regarding the installation and use of ground proximity warning devices, the Board notes that the decision is based on the assumption that "proper cockpit disciplines are maintained." We have found in several cases of this type that cockpit disciplines were disrupted by unusual actions or events and the crew was distracted from its task of monitoring the aircraft altitude. We believe that a ground proximity warning device would serve to bring the crew's attention back to the altimeters as the aircraft approached preselected altitudes during an instrument approach. Therefore, the Board again recommends that:
- The Administrator evaluate the need for the installation and use of ground proximity warning devices on air carrier aircraft.
After consideration of the airport qualifications established by FAR 121.443 and 121.445, the Board concludes that the requirements of 12.445 are less specific than those in 121.443. The Board believes that Part 121.445, or the carrier procedures promulgated thereunder, could be more specific, particularly in the manner by which the pilot is required to show that he has the requisite knowledge. Therefore, the Board recommends that:
- The FAA continue to emphasize the importance of the provisions of Part 121.445 in its surveillance and inspection of flight operations under Part 121. Such emphasis is needed to assure that these operators are (1) using the best means available to enable pilots to qualify under 121.445, and (2) requiring pilots to show that they have acquired the requisite knowledge prior to completion of a flight release.
Finally, the Board wishes to acknowledge and express continuing support for the long term Static Pressure Measurements Project undertaken by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration at the Lewis Research Center. The Board believes that these tests and similar efforts by other organizations will provide significant data on the flight and weather conditions which might lead to static system contamination and altitude misinformation, a subject which is invariably raised in connection with landing and approach accidents. The Board therefore urges that such testing be expedited and will await with anticipation the results thereof, which hopefully will shed some light on an area that has too many unknowns.
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