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The Babylonian Talmud.

because it is greater than peah (corner tithe), as the former applies also to figs and herbs, which is not the case with peah.

It was taught concerning the statement of the Mishna: He who forgot, etc., that Rabh and Samuel both said: Even a child that was captured by idolaters or a proselyte who remained among idolaters is regarded as one who was aware of the principle, but forgot it and is liable; and both R. Johanan and Resh Lakish said that the liability falls only upon him who was aware, but subsequently forgot; the child and the proselyte in question are considered as if they were never aware, and are free.

An objection was raised from the following: A general rule was laid down concerning the observation of the Sabbath. One who had entirely forgotten the principle of Sabbath, and had performed many kinds of work on many Sabbath days, is liable for but one sin-offering. How so? A child which was captured by idolaters and a proselyte remaining with idolaters, who had performed many acts of labor on different Sabbaths, are liable for but one sin-offering; and also for the blood or (prohibited) fats which he has consumed during the whole time, and even for worshipping idols during the whole time, he is liable for only one sin-offering. Munbaz, however, frees them entirely. And thus did he discuss before R. Aqiba: Since the intentional transgressor and the unintentional are both called sinners, I may say: As an intentional one cannot be called so unless he was aware that it is a sin, the same is the case with an unintentional, who cannot be called sinner unless he was at some time aware that this is a sin (it is true, then, the above must be considered as never having been aware of it). Said R. Aqiba to, him: "I will make an amendment to your decree, as the intentional transgressor cannot be considered as such unless he is cognizant of his guilt at the time of action, so also should not the unintentional transgressor be considered as such unless he is cognizant at the time of action." Answered Munbaz: "So it is, and the more so after your amendment." Thereupon R. Aqiba replied: "According to your reasoning, one could not be called an unintentional transgressor, but an intentional." Hence it is plainly stated: "How so? A child," etc. This is only in accordance with Rabh and Samuel, and it contradicts R. Johanan and R. Simeon b. Lakish. They may say: "Is there not a Tana Munbaz, who freed them? We hold with him and with his reason, namely: It is written [Numb. xv. 29]: "A law shall be for you, for him that acteth through igno-