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NIETZSCHE THE THINKER

here useful for the "instrument"; as a preservative principle against the peril of the passions—here useful for the "average"; as a preservative principle against the life-destroying effects of deep want and misery—here useful for the "suffering"; as a counter-principle against fearful explosion on the part of the powerful—here useful for the "humble."[1] He notes an experience like this: "I said to myself today, 'O that is a good man'! I had a feeling as if I had in my hand a beautiful, ripe, perfect apple with smooth skin: a feeling of tenderness, as of being drawn to him; a feeling of security, as if I might repose near him as under a tree; a feeling of reverence, as if I were in presence of an object to be touched only with the purest hands; a feeling of being satisfied, as if at one stroke I were released from discontent. That is, to the moral judgment 'good,' there corresponded a state in me arising as I thought of a certain man. It is the same as when I call a stone 'bard.'"[2] Surely one who could speak in this way cannot be taxed with insensibility to goodness. It is true that after a similar picture in another place, he asks, "Why should this undangerous man who affects us pleasantly, be of more worth to us than a dangerous, impenetrable, unreckonable man who forces us to be on our guard? Our pleasant feeling proves nothing"[3]—but the sensibility to goodness, the sense of its beauty, is none the less real. There is the same implication of a due valuation of contrasted things in another remark: "I do not wish to undervalue the amiable virtues; but greatness of soul is not compatible with them. Also in the fine arts, the great style excludes the pleasing."[4] The amiable virtues are not the highest, but they have their place. So with another remark: "Beyond good and evil [this of himself and his kind,]—but [in the group] we demand the unconditional holding sacred of group-morality (the supreme categories of which are "good and evil?"].[5] That is, "good and evil," though not the highest categories, are valid, unconditionally valid, in large

  1. Will to Power, § 266.
  2. Werke, XIII, 181-2, § 413.
  3. Ibid., XIV, 79, § 155.
  4. Will to Power, § 1040.
  5. Ibid., § 132. Cf. § 287 ["the point of view—Sinn—of the group shall rule in the group, but not beyond").