g Cf. the striking description of the manner of life of one who devotes himself to knowledge, Human, etc., § 291. Nietzsche thinks it new in history to make knowledge something more than a means—even among the Greeks it was a means to virtue, as among Christians a means to the soul's salvation (Joyful Science, § 123).
h Cf. Mixed Opinions etc., § 369: "There is a weariness of the finest and more cultivated minds, for whom the best that earth offers has become empty." See also, in the course of study of the psychology of the Apostle Paul, the appreciation of the religious idealism of ancient Israel, Dawn of Day, § 68. As to the lack of intellectual warrant, however, for the positions of religion, see Human, etc., §§ 110, 111, and the extreme statements of Dawn of Day, §§ 95, 464.
i Nietzsche is sometimes scarcely just either to religion or to metaphysics, showing, for instance, a strange lack of comprehension (strange particularly for one who knew Schopenhauer) of the Christian "Seelennoth," which sighs over inner corruption and craves salvation (Human, etc., § 27; Dawn of Day, § 57); he even speaks of the flattening and externalizing of the religious life which followed in the wake of the Renaissance as something to be looked upon with joy (Human, etc., § 237) . However, in another passage, "In honor of the homines religiosi" (Joyful Science, § 350), he virtually qualifies the last-named judgment, saying that the struggle against the church was partly the struggle of the commoner, more self-satisfied, and superficial natures against the graver and deeper ones.
j See a wonderful passage continuing this line of thought (Joyful Science, § 277) , and concluding, "In fact something plays with us now and then—dear accident: it takes us on occasion by the hand, and the wisest Providence could conceive no more beautiful music than our foolish hand succeeds in making."
k A legitimate use of the term "soul" is as covering those inner motions which come easy to one and hence are accomplished gladly and with grace; a man passes as soulless when these motions come hard and with effort (Dawn of Day, § 311). On the "soul" as an inner quantity in general, see Genealogy etc., II, § 16.
l Compare a similar view, worked out with convincing thoroughness, by the late Edmund Montgomery in his Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organization. Nietzsche has interesting comments on dreams as interpretations of bodily, particularly nervous states (Human, etc., § 13; Dawn of Day, § 119; Will to Power, § 479); if the dreams change, the conditions being the same, it is because varying impulses are in turn dominant in us (Joyful Science, § 119). Will, in the conscious sense, is, equally with consciousness in general, a secondary phenomenon (Dawn of Day, § 124). At the same time he seems to regard something akin to thought as belonging to the very nature of man, making the singular statement, "Man, like every living creature, thinks continually, but does not know it" (Meyer, op. cit., p. 359, quotes this from Joyful Science, but I cannot place it; cf. note gg, p. 500 of this volume).
m The contrasted requisites for describing and explaining are mentioned in Dawn of Day, § 428. Apparently Nietzsche held to the a priori nature of the causal idea—at least Joyful Science, § 98, looks that way.
n It must be admitted that an express and clear reconciling statement (such as one finds, for example, in Montgomery's book just alluded to) Nietzsche does not make.
CHAPTER XI
a Nietzsche also differs from Kant and Schopenhauer in that while they accept the feeling of responsibility at its face value, and argue
