proper (i.e., something commanding, imperative, bent on rule), the same in nature as in man. I do not mean that considerations of this sort meet all difficulties: some of his contradictions are perhaps incapable of resolution, e.g., that between a mechanistic and a teleological view of life. Nietzsche is now inclined in one way and now in another (cf. Werke, XIV, 353, § 215, with Beyond Good and Evil, § 36; Werke, XIII, 170, § 392; Will to Power, § 712). Still his drift as a whole, and indeed the particular significance of his doctrine of will to power, are antimechanistic. In ibid., § 712, he almost suggests the Bergsoniau view, "Absolute exclusion of mechanism and matter: both only forms of expression for the lower stages, the least spiritual shape that the will to power takes" ("die entgeistigste Form des Affekts, des 'Willena zur Macht'"). Had Nietzsche lived longer, he might have produced an articulated view to this effect.
z It must be admitted that §§ 563, 565 of Will to Power derive quality from differences of quantity, the contradiction being only obviated if "quality" here means something different from what it does in § 564, namely, a more or less æsthetic valuation, a human idiosyncrasy. It must be remembered that the grouping of paragraphs in Will to Power is the work of a later editor.
aa This does not mean that Nietzsche did not recognize the influence of environment—see his remarks on the shaping of races, Werke, XIV, 233, § 787. All the same, "the psychology of these M. Flauberts is in summa false: they see always simply the action of the outer world and the ego being formed (quite as Taine?),—they know only the weak in will, in whom desire takes the place of will" (ibid., XIV, 199, § 391). Again, "The theory of environment, now the Parisian theory par excellence, is itself a proof of a fateful disgregation of personality" (ibid., XIV, 215, § 434). Cf. Dorner's comment, op. cit., p. 139.
bb The sexual instinct is viewed in Will to Power, § 680, not as a mere necessity for the race, but as an expression of the strength or power of the individual, a maximal expression of power, which is superficially inconsistent with the view of propagation as the result of limited power expressed in ibid., § 654.
cc Nietzsche argues against Darwinism that the utility of an organ does not explain its rise, since during the greater part of the time it was forming, it may neither have preserved the individual nor been useful to him, least of all in the struggle with outer conditions and enemies (Will to Power, § 647; cf. Genealogy etc., II, § 12, where it is explained that the origin of a thing may have nothing to do with the use to which it is put by a superior power).
dd There is no mechanical necessity in the relation of the parts of an organism—much may be commanded that cannot be fully performed; hence, strain, e.g., of the stomach (Werke, XIII, 170, § 392; cf. 172, § 394).
ee The statement in the paragraph cited, "not 'increase of consciousness,' but heightening of power is the end," may possibly be directed against Fouillée, who also put will at the basis of things, but "will for consciousness" (according to A. Lalande, Philosophical Review, May, 1912, p. 294).
ff Nietzsche thinks that in a way pleasure rests on pain, being the sense of an obstacle that has been overcome. If the pleasure is to be great, the pain must be long, the tension of the bow extreme (Will to Power, § 658; cf. §§ 661, 694, 699). Pain, while different from pleasure, is not then its exact opposite; in will to pleasure, there is involved will to pain (ibid., §§ 490, 505, 669). He even goes so far as to say, "in itself there is no pain" (ibid., § 699); Schopenhauer had asserted the relativity of pain, but to the will (not necessarily to the intellect).
