And for this creative act there is in turn no other regulative than the individual will" (op. cit., p. 211).
e The high place which Nietzsche gives to justice appears notably in Genealogy etc., II, § 1; Will to Power, § 967; Werke, XIV, 80, § 158. He admits, indeed, that we can hardly be just to ideals which are different from our own (cf. Werke, XII, 136, §263), and that there is a natural antinomy, even in a philosopher, between strong love and hate and justice or fairness (Will to Power, §976).
CHAPTER XXIV
a Zarathustra says (II, ii), "If there were Gods, how could I endure to be no God?" It is easy to scoff at such a saying, but if we go beneath the surface, we see that it is only an extravagant way of expressing the deeply-felt obligation to be like God which is at the root of the saying of Jesus. See the illuminating remarks of Simmel, op. cit., pp. 204-5.
b Cf. the early statement in "Schopenhauer as Educator," sect. 6, beginning, "I see something higher and more human above me than I myself am" (quoted in full on p. 61). In a way the impulse rested on a need—a pressing need in his case, familiar with the tragic view of things as he was—the need of something joy-producing: "Love to men? But I say, Joy in men! and that this may not be irrational, we must help produce what will give joy"—hence select, seek out, and further those who do, or may, and let the misshapen and degenerate die out (Werke, XI, 247-8, §213).
c No one has developed this general view with greater thoroughness than Edmund Montgomery (see his Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organization, and numerous articles in Mind and The Monist). Montgomery writes as a biologist, with at the same time the broader outlook and the penetration of the philosopher.
d See the general line of considerations in Werke, XIII, 181, § 412. Dolson says that the existence of the altruistic instincts was "admitted," but "deplored" by Nietzsche—"one must conquer them" (op. cit., p. 100). This, as a broad statement, is distinctly a mistake. Altruism is only deplored when exercised in a certain way. She is also mistaken in saying that the higher man in sacrificing himself sacrifices "only that side of his nature that finds expression in self-sacrifice" (p. 101)—he may sacrifice himself altogether, giving up his life.
e Cf. A. W. Benn, International Journal of Ethics, October, 1908, pp. 19-21. But when Benn suggests that Nietzsche was prevented from accepting utilitarianism by the pervading skeptical and negative cast of his intellect, aggravated by the use of drugs and solitary habits, he is hardly sagacious.
f For Nietzsche's various and varying views of pleasure and happiness, cf. Werke, XI, 219, §153; XIV, 88, §177; Will to Power, §260 (where the point is that happiness may be reached in opposite ways, and hence is no basis for ethics); Zarathustra, prologue, § 5 (a description of the happiness of a degenerate type of man); Dawn of Day, § 339; Werke, XII, 148, § 295; Will to Power, § 260 (habit, necessity, and our own valuations of things factors in determining pleasure and pain); Werke, XIII, 208-9, § 477 (happiness as distinguished from enjoyment, Genuss); Dawn of Day, § 108 (the happiness of different stages of development incomparable with one another, being neither higher nor lower, but simply peculiar).
g H. Goebel and E. Antrim do not take this into account when they speak (among other things) of the "right of the individual to obey absolutely all the instincts and impulses of his nature," as "Nietzscheanism"
