conflicts, other parts of the society may take sides, and the life of the whole be endangered—one thinks of the Wars of the Roses, and of feuds such as have often existed between noble families. But though such possibilities cannot be denied, Nietzsche's ordinary thought of an aristocracy is of something cohering—indeed, something which makes a principle of coherence and organization for the society to which it belongs: the same men, who, in one aspect of their being, are individuals proper, are, in another, functionaries of (if only to the extent of giving legislative thought to) the society. If then they push their individualistic instincts so far, that they go to fighting one another and jeopardizing the life of the society, they must be restrained. As if envisaging a situation of this general character, Nietzsche once defined it as the problem of the legislator to join together forces out of order, so that they shall not destroy themselves in conflict with one another, and so secure a real increase of force (I follow here Halévy's Vie, p. 341, not being able to locate the passage he cites). He calls it the task of culture to take into service all that is fearful, singly, experimentally, step by step, adding, however, that till it is strong enough to do this, it must fight, moderate, or even curse what is fearful (Will to Power, § 1025; cf. Werke, XII, 92, §182). For, as already explained, temporary hostility to great men may be justified on grounds of economy—they may use up force too quickly, which, if stored, would grow to greater (Will to Power, § 896).
aa In one passage (Werke, XII, 119, §233) Nietzsche even questions whether the ends of the individual are necessarily those of the species, but here I think he means of a given species. The variant individual may be the principle of the possibility of a higher species, or he may be a species (so to speak) all by himself: humanity may present a succession of species, one rising above another.
bb Morality (in the usual sense) regards man as function purely, i.e., so far degrades him—this being said, of course, only from the highest point of view. Cf. Joyful Science, § 116.
cc The question is sometimes raised (e.g., by Höffding, op. cit., pp. 68-9) whether Nietzsche was an Utilitarian. It is a question which has, to one who has felt the new issues which Nietzsche raises, a somewhat antiquated air; all the same we may say that if Utilitarianism is the doctrine of the greatest good of the greatest number (or of all—each counting for one and no more than one) as the standard, Nietzsche was not an Utilitarian, since he held that there may be individuals who are more important than others, even than all the rest combined. Quite as little was he an Utilitarian so far as this is an eudaemonistic doctrine, for questions of pleasure and pain (no matter how universalistically conceived) have a secondary place with him. But so far as Utilitarianism means that actions are good and bad not in themselves, but with reference to ends beyond them, the highest end being the highest possible development of humanity, Nietzsche was an Utilitarian, for he broke entirely with Intuitionalism (which is little more than uncritical common sense turned into a formal doctrine): nothing to him is good or bad, right or wrong, of itself, or as a divine command, or as an unanalyzable dictate of conscience. At the same time the highest development of humanity is not conceived in social but rather in personal terms—hence the happy characterization of his doctrine by Simmel as Personalism. The actions of the mass, indeed, the mass themselves and all who stop short of being persons, are viewed in an utilitarian light—he speaks of himself in this way ("fearful," yet "beneficent," Ecce Homo, IV, §2); but the supreme individuals are not utilities, being rather the standard by which utility in all else is measured.
dd Nietzsche's view that the flock-feeling (social sentiment) should
