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ON THE ROAD

pessimist. If this is right, it is ranging oneself at once with the Libers and the Dans, who have thousands of times proclaimed that the soviets were a pistol, and thousands of times have deceived the people; for, under their control, the soviets were absolutely nothing at all.

But if we want a bullet in the pistol, this is equivalent to preparing the technique of the insurrection, for the bullet must be found and the pistol loaded: besides, one bullet will not be enough.

We must either frankly adopt the Liber-Dan platform and frankly renounce the resolution: "All Power to the Soviets," or we must adopt straight-out insurrection. There is no middle course.


"… The bourgeoisie, in spite of Rodzianko's desire, cannot deliver Petrograd to the Germans, for it is not the bourgeois, but our heroic sailors who do the fighting. …"

This argument, too, is charged with that "optimism" about the bourgeoisie which is shown only too clearly at every moment by those who have only pessimism for the strength and revolutionary capacity of the proletariat.

It is the heroic sailors who do the fighting, but this did not prevent two admirals from running away before the capture of Essex Island.

This is a fact! Facts are facts. They prove that admirals, just as much as Kornilov, are capable of being traitors. The general staff has not changed, the corps of officers is Kornilovian: this, too, is an irrefutable fact.

If the Kornilovians (directed by Kerensky who is a Kornilovian himself) want to give up Petrograd, they have two, even three ways of doing so.

First of all, they could, through treason among the highest officers, open the Northern sector of the land front.

Secondly, they could arrange with the German and the English imperialists for the freedom of action of the whole German Fleet, which is stronger than ours, and which will be directed against us. Besides the "vanished" admirals have been able to give our plans to the Germans.

Thirdly, by a lock-out and by interfering with the arrival of barley, they could reduce our troops to despair and to complete helplessness.