dilemma? By the allowance of the supplemental return an issue of fact would be formed in a proceeding where the trial of an issue of fact is postively prohibited by law. It is true that in nearly all the states there now exists some form of statutory writ of certiorari broader in its scope and more flexible in its operation than the common law writ to which we are confined.
It is urged upon us, however, that the return to the supplemental writ does not, in fact, contradict the record of the justice as the statute requires it to be kept; that the statute nowhere requires the justise to enter the time or place of entering judgment; and that the words, “Dated at Kindred, Cass county, N. D., January 3rd, 1890,” not being required by statute, form no part of the record proper, and hence can be contradicted by parol. It is true that entry is not specially enjoined. We may erase it, and still the difficulty is not removed, because the facts stated in that entry are necessarily presumed from what the law does require to be made matter of record. In every ease in justice court when all the entries that the law requires to be made are made (and there is no claim that the transcript as returned in this case does not show all the entries required by statute), the record must necessarily show a valid judgment; otherwise a judgment of a justice of the peace could not be proven by the docket or a transcript thereof. But, as we have already seen, the judgment in order to be valid, must be entered at once on the return of the verdict, and the justice must make the entry while in the proper township and county. Hence, in this case, with the quoted entry erased, we must presume from the record that the judgment was entered on January 3, 1890, in Norman Township, Cass county, N. D.; otherwise we would have a judgment containing every entry that the statute requires, yet void on its face. To allow the necessary presumptions arising from a record to be contradicted by parol would be just as fatal to the record in every case as to allow the express words of the record to be contradicted. In Cassidy v. Millerick, supra, the justice stated that he called the case at the town hall three miles from his office, but the court said: “Upon such a writ [certiorari] it must be conclusively pre-
