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thus discovered and reported were covered by the warranty. This construction ‘would be very narrow, and we do not think the language requires it. It would convert a provision intended for the buyer’s protection into a trap for his undoing. It would be difficult, often impossible, for the buyer, upon a trial of an hour's duration, or even in a half day, to inspect each portion of a steam engine, boiler and grain separator, sufficiently to discover whether or not it was perfect, and properly performed its functions. When next started, in different grain, and under less favorable circumstances, portions of the machinery might be found entirely inadequate. Yet, under the construction contended for, the buyer’s mouth would be closed. We do not think the buyer understood, or that the seller intended him to understand, that he was receiving only this restricted and unsatisfactory protection. Independent of any conditions in the warranty, it was incumbent upon appellant to be ordinary dilligent to discover, and prompt to report, any defects in the machinery that would constituted a breach of the seller's warranty; and any continued use of the machinery, after knowledge of the defects, without notice thereof to the seller, would prevent a recission of the contract, and a return of the property. It would be an election upon the part of the buyer to affirm the contract. Locke v. Williamson, 40 Wis. 377; Boothby v. Scales, 27 Wis. 626; Sparling v. Marks, 86 Ill. 125; Marshall v. Perry, 67 Me. 78; Cookingham v. Dusa, 41 Kan. 229; 21 Pac. Rep. 95; Polhemus v. Heiman, 45 Cal. 573. But the retention and use of the property, without notice of defects, under the great preponderance of the later—and, as we think, better—authorities, affects only the right to rescind. The buyer may still rely upon the breach of warranty to defeat a recovery, in whole or in part, in an action brought by the seller to recover the purchase price. Continued use of the property, with knowledge of defects, and without notice or complaint of the seller, may be more or less persuasive as evidence of waiver of defects, but cannot establish such waiver as a matter of law. See, generally, Kellogg v. Denslow, 14 Conn. 411; Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Thierer, 34 la. 272; Muller v. Eno, 14 N.Y. 597;