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NORTH DAKOTA REPORTS.

we think the affidavit in this case much more vulnerable than in that. It not only entirely fails to show that any diligence whatever had been exercised to find defendant in this state, but fails to give any satisfactory information as to defendant's residence. It was made by the attorney, and states, on information and belief, that defendant's residence is at Philadelphia, Pa.; and the sources of information are stated to be statements made by plaintiff to the attorney, and the fact that certain papers which the attorney had never seen were sworn to by her in that city. This latter circumstance could have no probative force in the mind of a lawyer, and we are at a loss to understand why the plaintiff himself did not make the affidavit, instead of making statements to his attorney. He verified the complaint on the same day, before a notary public, in the same county, and presumably at the same place. True, these affidavits may properly be made-by an attorney, but when the truth of the matter stated rests upon the unsworn statement of the client, and the client is present, good faith to the court requires that some reason be given why the client does not make the affidavit. We think the affidavit was insufficient in this case, and that the court was without jurisdiction of the defendant at the time the decree was granted.

But, when the respondent came into court with her motion to set aside the decree, she made no special appearance, nor did she attack the decree on the ground of want of jurisdiction only, but also upon the further grounds of fraud and deceit practiced upon herself and upon the court, and the insufficiency of the evidence to support the decree. The petition asked that the entire proceedings be set aside, or, if that could not be done, that she be allowed to come in and defend. This was a voluntary and un} qualified submission to the jurisdiction of the court, generally, and, although made after judgment, was a waiver of all defects in, the process. Elliott v. Lawhead, 43 Ohio St. 171, 1 N. E. Rep. 577; Leake v. Gallogly, (Neb.) 52 N. W. Rep. 824; Grantier v. Rosecrance, 27 Wis. 488; Anderson v. Coburn, 1d. 558; Insurance Co. v. Swineford, 28 Wis. 257; Carpentier v. Minturn, 65 Barb. 293: