Page:Nutraceutical Corporation v. Troy Lambert.pdf/10

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

8

NEUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT

Opinion of the Court

not its determination whether a petition is timely. If anything, the comment serves as a reminder that interlocutory appeal is an exception to the general rule that appellate review must await final judgment–which is fully consistent with a conclusion that Rule 23(f)’s time limit is purposefully unforgiving. See Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 106 (2009) (“The justification for immediate appeal must… be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation concludes”); cf. Baker, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (describing Rule 23(f) as “the product of careful calibration”).^[1]

Finally, Lambert notes that every Court of Appeals to have considered the question would accept a Rule 23(f) petition filed within 14 days of the resolution of a motion for reconsideration that was itself filed within 14 days of the original order. See 870 F. 3d, at 1177–1178, n. 3 (collecting cases). Although Lambert’s own reconsideration motion was not filed until after the initial 14 days had run,^[2] he cites the lower courts’ handling of such cases as evidence that Rule 23(f) is indeed amenable to tolling. He further suggests that there is no basis for relaxing the 14-day limit in one situation but not the other.

Lambert’s argument relies on a mistaken premise. A
———————

↑ Lambert also argues that interpreting Rule 23(f) flexibly would be consistent with the Rules’ generally equitable approach. Brief for Respondent 21–27. But that simply fails to engage with the dispositive point here: Any such background preference for flexibility has been overcome by the clear text of the relevant rules. See, e. g., Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43, 49 (2002).
↑ Lambert argues that his counsel’s statements 10 days after the District Court’s decertification order constituted an oral motion for reconsideration, but the transcript belies any such claim. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 71 (requesting only “leave to file”); id., at 74 (informing the District Court that Lambert “will want to file” a reconsideration motion).

[1] Lambert also argues that interpreting Rule 23(f) flexibly would be consistent with the Rules’ generally equitable approach. Brief for Respondent 21–27. But that simply fails to engage with the dispositive point here: Any such background preference for flexibility has been overcome by the clear text of the relevant rules. See, e. g., Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43, 49 (2002).

[2] Lambert argues that his counsel’s statements 10 days after the District Court’s decertification order constituted an oral motion for reconsideration, but the transcript belies any such claim. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 71 (requesting only “leave to file”); id., at 74 (informing the District Court that Lambert “will want to file” a reconsideration motion).

[1]

[2]