Page:Nutraceutical Corporation v. Troy Lambert.pdf/5

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Cite as: 586 U. S. ___ (2019)

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Opinion of the Court

“recognize[d] that other circuits would likely not toll the Rule 23(f) deadline in Lambert’s case.”^[1] Id., at 1179. We granted certiorari. 585 U. S. ___ (2018).

II

When Lambert filed his petition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) authorized courts of appeals to “permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification… if a petition for permission to appeal is filed… within 14 days after the order is entered.”^[2] The Court of Appeals held that Rule 23(f)’s time limitation is nonjurisdictional and thus, necessarily, subject to equitable tolling. While we agree that Rule 23(f) is nonjurisdictional, we conclude that it is not subject to equitable tolling.

Because Rule 23(f)’s time limitation is found in a procedural rule, not a statute, it is properly classified as a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 8).^[3] It therefore can be waived or
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↑ See Nucor Corp. v. Brown, 760 F. 3d 341, 343 (CA4 2014); Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr., 639 F. 3d 28, 31 (CA2 2011); Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F. 3d 187, 193, and n. 5 (CA3 2008); McNamara v. Felderhof, 410 F. 3d 277, 281 (CA5 2005); Gary v. Sheahan, 188 F. 3d 891, 892 (CA7 1999).
↑ Rule 23(f) has since been amended and now reads, in relevant part: “A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification…. A party must file a petition for permission to appeal… within 14 days after the order is entered….” The difference is immaterial for purposes of this case.
↑ To be sure, this Court has previously suggested that time limits for taking an appeal are “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U. S. 196, 203 (1988). As our more recent precedents have made clear, however, this Court once used that phrase in a “ ‘less than meticulous’ ” manner. Hamer, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454 (2004). Those earlier statements did not necessarily signify that the rules at issue were formally

[1] See Nucor Corp. v. Brown, 760 F. 3d 341, 343 (CA4 2014); Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr., 639 F. 3d 28, 31 (CA2 2011); Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F. 3d 187, 193, and n. 5 (CA3 2008); McNamara v. Felderhof, 410 F. 3d 277, 281 (CA5 2005); Gary v. Sheahan, 188 F. 3d 891, 892 (CA7 1999).

[2] Rule 23(f) has since been amended and now reads, in relevant part: “A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification…. A party must file a petition for permission to appeal… within 14 days after the order is entered….” The difference is immaterial for purposes of this case.

[Court3-3] To be sure, this Court has previously suggested that time limits for taking an appeal are “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U. S. 196, 203 (1988). As our more recent precedents have made clear, however, this Court once used that phrase in a “ ‘less than meticulous’ ” manner. Hamer, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454 (2004). Those earlier statements did not necessarily signify that the rules at issue were formally

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