monstration is the same; but if the particular proposition be assumed as negative, and the universal affirmative, and retain the same position as if A happens to be present to every B, but B happens not to be present with some C, no evident syllogism arises from the assumed propositions, but the particular being converted and B being assumed to be contingently present with some C, there will be the same conclusion as before in the first syllogisms. Still if the major proposition be taken as particular, but the minor as universal, and if both be assumed affirmative or negative, or of different figure, or both indefinite or particular, there will never be a syllogism; for there is nothing to prevent B from being more widely extended than A, and from not being equally predicated. Now let that by which B exceeds A, be assumed to be C, to this it will happen that A is present neither to every, nor to none, nor to a certain one, nor not to a certain one, since contingent propositions are convertible, and B may happen to be present to more things than A. Besides, this is evident from the terms, for when the propositions are thus, the first is contingent to the last, and to none, and necessarily present with every individual, and let the common terms of all be these; of being present necessarily "animal," "white," "man," but of not being contingent, "animal," "white," "garment." Therefore it is clear that when the terms are thus there is no syllo-
Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 1 (1853).djvu/129
