such opinions as imagine the non-inherent to be inherent, nor the inherent to be non-inherent, (for both are infinite, both as many as imagine the non-inherent to be inherent, and the inherent to be non-inherent); but in those things in which there is deception, (therein we admit contraries,) and these are from which there are generations; generations however are from opposltes, wherefore deceptions also. If then good is good and not evil, and the one is essential, but the other accidental—(for it is accidental to it not to be evil) and of every thing the opinion is more true and false which is essential, if the true (be assumed)—the opinion that good is not good, is false in respect of that which is essentially inherent, but the opinion that it is evil is false of that which is from accident, so that the opinion of the negation of good would be more false than the opinion of the contrary. He is however especially deceived about every thing who holds a contrary opinion, for contraries belong to things which are the most diverse about the same thing. If then one of these is contrary, but the opinion of the negation is more contrary, it is evident that this itself will be (truly) contrary; but the opinion that the good is evil is complex, for it is necessary perhaps, that the same man should suppose (good) not good. Once more, if it is requisite for the like to occur in other things, it may seem to have been well said in this case also; for the (opposition) of negation is either every where or no where; but whatever things have no contraries, of these, the opposite to the true opinion is false, as he is mistaken who fancies "a man" "not a man," if then these (negations) are contrary the other (opinions) also, of negation, are. Besides, it is the same as to the opinion of good that it is good, and of what is not good, that it is not good; and also the opinion of good, that it is not good, and of what is not good that it is good; to the opinion then of the not good that it is not good, which is true, what will be the contrary? Certainly not that which says that it is evil, since it may at one and the same time be true; but truth is never contrary to truth, for whatever is not good is evil, so that it will happen that these opinions, shall be at one and the same time, true. Nor again will that (opinion) that it is not
Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 1 (1853).djvu/96
