Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/113

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Secondly, from things predicated or not predicated, and of which they are predicated or not predicated, subverting it indeed if affirmation is not the property, of affirmation; for neither will negation be the property of negation, and if negation is not the property of negation, neither will affirmation be the property of affirmation. Thus, since animal is not the property of man, neither would what is not animal be the property of what is not man, and if what is not animal appears to be not the property of what is not man, neither will animal be the property of man. We confirm it, on the contrary, if affirmation is the property of affirmation, for negation will also be the property of negation, and if negation is the property of negation, affirmation also will be the property of affirmation; thus, since not to live is the property of what is not animal, to live would be the property of animal; and if to live appears the property of animal, not to live will appear the property of what is not animal.

Thirdly, from subjects themselves, subverting indeed if the assigned property is the property of affirmation, since the same will not also be the property of negation; but if what is assigned be the property of negation, it will not be the property of affirmation; thus, since the animated is the property of animal, the animated would not be the property of what is not animal. On the other hand confirming it, if the assigned be not the property of affirmation, for it would be that of negation. This place however is false, for affirmation is not the property of negation, nor negation of affirmation, for affirmation is not wholly present with negation, but negation is with affirmation, yet is not present as a property.

Next, from things oppositely divided, subverting indeed, if none of the oppositely divided is the property of no one of the remaining oppositely divided, since neither will what is stated, be the property of that of which it is stated as the property; thus, since sensible animal is the property of no other animal, intelligible animal would not be the property of God. Again, confirming it, if any one of the remainder oppositely divided, is the property of each of these