can be the definition of the contrary, so that neither has the definition given at first been rightly given. Nevertheless, since some contraries are said to be so, from the privation of another, as inequality seems the privation of equality, (for things are called unequal which are not equal,) it is clear that what is stated to be contrary as to privation, is necessarily defined through the other, but that it is no longer (necessary) that what remains (should be defined) through what is predicated as to privation, for each would happen to become known through each. We must pay attention, therefore, to such an error as this in contraries, as if some one should define equality to be the contrary to inequality, since it is defined through what is predicated according to privation. Further it is necessary that he who thus defines should use the thing defined, which indeed will be evident if the definition be assumed instead of the name, for there is no difference between saying inequality or the privation of equality, wherefore, equality will be the contrary to the privation of equality, so that the thing itself (defined) will be employed. Still if neither contrary should be predicated according to privation, but the definition similarly assigned, as that good is what is contrary to evil, it is evident that evil will be what is contrary to good, since of things thus contrary, the definition must be similarly assigned. Wherefore, again, the thing defined happens to be employed, as good is inherent in the definition of evil, so that if good is what is contrary to evil, but there is no difference between evil and the contrary to good, good will be that which is contrary to the contrary of good, so that the person has evidently used the thing itself.
Further, (remark) whether he who assigns what is predicated according to privation, has not assigned that of which it is the privation; for instance of habit, or of contrary, or of whatever it is the privation; or whether he has not added that
