necessary in such cases, that there should be a change of the names, either of all, or of some of them, since there are no more names stated now than before; still it is requisite that he who defines should give a sentence instead of names, of all, if possible, but if not, of most things. For thus also in simple things, he who changes the name will have defined, as, for instance, (if he should say) vestment instead of garment.
Besides there is a greater error, if a person has made a change for names more unknown for instance, a white mortal instead of a white man, for neither is there a definition, and what is stated thus, is less clear.
Examine also in the change of names, whether he does not signify still the same thing, as when a person states that contemplative science is contemplative opinion, for opinion is not the same with science, at least indeed it must be, if the whole is to be the same, for contemplative is common in both definitions, but what remains is different.
Further, when a person changes one of the names, observe whether a change is made, not of the difference, but of the genus, as in the instance just now stated, since contemplative is more unknown than science, as the one is genus, and the other difference, and genus is most known of all, so that he ought to have made the change not of the genus, but of the difference, since this is the more unknown. Or is this reproof ridiculous, as there is nothing to prevent difference from being signified by a name most known, but genus not? but if this is the case, it is clear that we must make a change, as to the name of genus, and not of difference. Nevertheless, if (a person) does not assume a name for a name, but a sentence instead of a name, it is clear that he must give the definition of difference rather
