If moreover any thing should be demonstrated from both probable (propositions), yet not similarly probable, there is nothing to prevent what is demonstrated, being more probable than either (proposition), but if one be probable, but the other neither (probable nor improbable), or if one be probable, but the other not, if they be similarly so, (the conclusion) will also similarly be and not be, but if one is more, (the conclusion) will follow that which is more.
Now this also is an error in syllogisms, when a person demonstrates through more, what is possible through fewer things, which also are inherent in the argument; as if any one, (in order to show) that one opinion is better than another, should require it to be granted, that each thing itself subsists in the most eminent degree, but that the object of opinion is truly itself; wherefore it is more than certain other things, but what is said to be more, is referred to the more, and the opinion itself is true, which will be more accurate than certain things; yet it was required to be granted that opinion itself is true, and that each thing itself most eminently subsists, wherefore this opinion itself is more accurate. Now, what is the fault here? It is that it makes the cause latent, from which the reasoning is derived.
