Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/19

same," to speak in general terms, may appear to be divided triply, since we are accustomed to denominate a thing the same, in number, or in species, or in genus; in number indeed when the names are many but the thing one, as a garment and a vestment, but in species when the things being many are without specific difference, as man with man, and horse with horse, for such things are said to be the same in species as are under the same species: in like manner also, those are the same in genus which are under the same genus, as horse with man. Nevertheless, it may seem indeed that water from the same fountain, being called the same, has a certain difference besides the modes enumerated, yet such a thing must be placed at least in the same arrangement with those, which are in some way or other said to be under one species, for all such things appear to be of a kindred nature and similar to each other, since all water is said to be the same in species with all water, because of the possession of a certain similarity; but water from the same fountain differs in nothing else except that the similarity is greater; wherefore we do not separate it from those which some way or other are said to be according to one species. Confessedly, however, that which is one in number, seems especially to be called the same, by all men; still we usually attribute this in many ways, most properly indeed and chiefly, when "same" is attributed in name or definition, as garment to a vestment, and animal pedestrian biped, to man; secondly, when (it is attributed) in property, as what is susceptible of science to man, and what naturally is carried upwards, to fire; thirdly, when from accident, as that which sits or is musical, to Socrates. For all these would signify one thing in number, and that what we have now said is true, a person may especially learn, from those who change appellations; for frequently when we desire to call some one who is sitting, by name, we change (the appellation), when he to whom we give the order, does not happen to understand, as if he would rather understand from accidents, and we desire him to call to us, the person who is sitting or discours-