thing which cannot altogether be present with those which air under genus, thus, if the soul partakes of life, but no number can possibly live, the soul would not be a species of number.
Notice also, whether the species is equivocal with the genus, employing for (the investigation of) the equivocal, the elements before mentioned, for genus and species, are synonymous.
Since however there are many species of every genus, we must observe whether there may not be another species of the proposed genus, for if there is not, it is evident, in short, that the thing spoken of will not be genus.
Likewise observe, whether a person has proposed as genus, that which is spoken of metaphorically, as that temperance is symphony, for every genus is properly predicated of species, but symphony is not properly predicated of temperance, but metaphorically, for all symphony is in sounds.
Again, whether a thing be contrary to species; and this consideration is multifarious; first, indeed, whether in the same genus there is also a contrary when there is not a contrary to genus, for contraries must necessarily be in the same genus, if nothing is contrary to genus. If however there is any thing contrary to genus, we must observe whether the contrary is in the contrary (genus), since it is necessary that the contrary should be in the contrary, if any thing is contrary to genus; each of these however appears through induction. Moreover, if in short the contrary to species, is in no genus, but is itself a genus, as the good, for if this is not in genus, neither will the contrary to this be in genus, but will be itself genus, as happens in the case of good and evil, since neither of these is in genus, but is each of them a genus. Further, whether both genus and species are contrary to a certain thing, and whether there is any thing between some,
