Scalia, J., dissenting
ment is supposed to work.[1]
The Constitution places some constraints on self-rule–constraints adopted by the People themselves when they ratified the Constitution and its Amendments. Forbidden are laws “impairing the Obligation of Contracts,”[2] denying “Full Faith and Credit” to the “public Acts” of other States,[3] prohibiting the free exercise of religion,[4] abridging the freedom of speech,[5] infringing the right to keep and bear arms,[6] authorizing unreasonable searches and seizures,[7] and so forth. Aside from these limitations, those powers “reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”[8] can be exercised as the States or the People desire. These cases ask us to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment contains a limitation that requires the States to license and recognize marriages between two people of the same sex. Does it remove that issue from the political process?
Of course not. It would be surprising to find a prescription regarding marriage in the Federal Constitution since, as the author of today’s opinion reminded us only two years ago (in an opinion joined by the same Justices who join him today):
“[R]egulation of domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.”[9]
- ↑ Accord, Schuette v. BAMN, 572 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2014) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 15, 17).
- ↑ U. S. Const., Art. I., § 10.
- ↑ Art. IV, § 1.
- ↑ Amdt. 1.
- ↑ Ibid.
- ↑ Amdt. 2.
- ↑ Amdt. 4.
- ↑ Amdt. 10.
- ↑ United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 16) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
