Page:Olcott v. Delaware Flood Co.pdf/13

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jurisdiction is not defeated by the possibility that complaint fails to state a cause of action on which a plaintiff could actually recover). Nor does the court's dismissal of all substantive claims deprive the court of authority to enforce a previously entered sanction. A district court retains jurisdiction to impose and enforce sanctions until the court enters a final judgment.^[1] See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (any order that fails to adjudicate all rights and liabilities does not terminate the action). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (limiting appellate jurisdiction, which divests district court of jurisdiction over matters connected to the appeal, to final decisions of the district court). District court proceedings are not final until the district court has rendered a decision that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. See Copeland, 136 F.3d at 1252. This matter was not final until the district court entered its final judgment order quantifying Plaintiff's damage award following the set-off hearing. The February 4, 1998 order, which Defendants allege dismissed Plaintiff's remaining substantive claims, expressly contemplates further proceedings before the district court. Accordingly, the

↑ Contrary to Defendants' assertions, Olcott II does not dictate otherwise. In Olcott II, the district court entered an order dismissing all claims and imposing a monetary sanction without referring to its prior entry of default. We found significant the district court's omission of any reference to the entry of default and concluded the district court intended "only to impose the [monetary] sanction [and] to abandon the default judgment as a sanction." Olcott II specifically ruled that the district court's judgment order dismissing all claims was a final decision. By contrast, every order the district court entered following remand expressly stated the district court's intent to enforce the entry of default. Defendants allege the district court dismissed Plaintiff's substantive claims in the February 4, 1998 order. Although we find otherwise, even were this the case the order is not final in that it expressly contemplates subsequent proceedings on the default sanction. See Copeland, 136 F.3d at 1252 (discussing finality of district court decisions).

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[1] Contrary to Defendants' assertions, Olcott II does not dictate otherwise. In Olcott II, the district court entered an order dismissing all claims and imposing a monetary sanction without referring to its prior entry of default. We found significant the district court's omission of any reference to the entry of default and concluded the district court intended "only to impose the [monetary] sanction [and] to abandon the default judgment as a sanction." Olcott II specifically ruled that the district court's judgment order dismissing all claims was a final decision. By contrast, every order the district court entered following remand expressly stated the district court's intent to enforce the entry of default. Defendants allege the district court dismissed Plaintiff's substantive claims in the February 4, 1998 order. Although we find otherwise, even were this the case the order is not final in that it expressly contemplates subsequent proceedings on the default sanction. See Copeland, 136 F.3d at 1252 (discussing finality of district court decisions).

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