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has produced it. To vindicate this position the evolutionist must know the latter proposition to be true. But if he does he has a higher knowledge than the criterion itself, because it is knowledge from which the criterion derives its value, and thus the criterion is not the ultimate criterion for him. The evolutionist has fallen into this contradiction apparently because he, has forgotten that he himself is one of the last terms of the series.
(ii) Or the difficulty may be put thus. The inconceivableness of the contradictory of an axiom has been produced, it is said, by a constant experience in the race, which again corresponds to a universal truth without exception. How does the evolutionist know that the experience of the race has been such, for he cannot have had it; and à fortiori how can he know the universality of the corresponding fact in nature? Apparently from what has been quoted he thinks he knows. Being the last term of the series he can only know the fact by the inconceivability which he supposes it has produced in himself: and thus the invariable experience and the corresponding fact give the criterion its value, and they themselves are only known by the criterion: which is arguing in a circle.
This may be shortly put by saying that the evolutionist philosopher has cut himself off from the possibility of giving the necessary evidence in favour of his own theory.
But it may be answered that though satisfactory evidence for the theory cannot be given, it is a possible hypothesis, and though it may have to surrender all claims to establish the validity of our beliefs, it may be true, for constant experience might produce such an effect on our organism.
This of course would be giving up a great part of the evolutionist position.
In the first place, it must be answered that according to biological laws the loss of a function or of an organ may
