rei existentis (nimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere), vel debere extra ipsam dari. [1] In the last case he means an efficient cause, as appears from what follows, whereas in the first he means a mere reason of knowledge ; yet he identifies both, and by this means prepares the way for identifying God with the world, which is his intention. This is the artifice of which he always makes use, and which he has learnt from Descartes. He substitutes a cause acting from without, for a reason of knowledge lying within, a given conception. Ex necessitate divince naturæ omnia, quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, sequi debent? [2] At the same time he calls God everywhere the cause of the world. Quidquid existit Dei potentiam, quce omnium rerum cuas est, exprimit. [3] —Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens. [4] Deus non tantam est causa eficens rerum existentice, sed etiam essentiæ. [5] —Ex data quacunque idea aliquis effectus necessario sequi debat. [6] —And: Nulla res nisi a causa externa potest destrui. [7] —Demonstr. Definitio cujuscunque rei, ipsius essentiam (essence, nature, as differing from existentia, existence), affirmat, sed non negat; sive rei essentiam ponit, sed non tollit. Dum itaque ad rem ipsam tanturn, non autem ad causas externas altendimus, nihil in eadem poterimus invenire, quod ipsam possit destruere. This means, that as no conception can contain anything which contradicts its definition, i.e., the sum total of its predicates, neither can an existence contain anything which might become a cause of its destruction. This view, however, is brought to a climax in the somewhat lengthy second demonstration of the 11th Proposition, in which he confounds a cause capable of destroying or annihilating
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