LAST WEEK.
Last Week commenced under happy auspices, inasmuch as on Wednesday last—the l6th of January—there was reported in our public journals the decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench in the matter of John Anderson, the fugitive slave, now lying in Toronto gaol. An affidavit was presented to this Court on the part of L. A. Chamerovzow, the secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, in which it was stated in substance that John Anderson, of the city of Toronto, in her Majesty’s province of Canada, a British subject, domiciled there, was illegally detained in the gaol of that city against his will; that he was not legally accused, tried, or sentenced for the commission of any crime or offence against the laws of Canada, or recognised by the laws of that province, or in any other part of the Queen’s dominions; and that unless a peremptory writ of habeas corpus should issue, the life of the said John Anderson was in the most imminent and immediate danger.
The application was based primarily on the ground that John Anderson was a British subject domiciled at Toronto. The law presumes primd facie that the place of a man’s actual residence is the place of his domicile. This presumption may, of course, be rebutted by positive proof that he has either come to live in a foreign land for a limited time, or for a special purpose; or, in legal phrase, that he has not in point of fact an animus manendi, or an intention of making that country his place of permanent abode. Clearly in the case of John Anderson the proof confirms the presumption. There can be little doubt, indeed, that any suggestion to the effect that Anderson contemplated either presently, or at any period, however remote, a return to the province of Missouri, in the United States, would be disposed of readily enough.
We must crave the indulgence of our readers if we venture to introduce for once the jargon of lawyers into the columns of Once a Week. The interests of humanity, and the fair name, and honourable reputation of this country, are involved in the decision to be pronounced in the case of this poor coloured man. The contest must be decided by lawyers, and in courts of law; it may not therefore be amiss to examine in popular language the chief points which have fallen, or which may fall under their consideration. These are the tools with which we must work in this matter—it is as well to understand their use.
The Canadian Court having decided, as we think (and as we stated a fortnight back, immediately upon receipt in England of the intelligence), erroneously, that the fugitive slave Anderson should be handed back to the agents of the United States, the next point was, as far as the Canadian judges were concerned, that they should discuss his right of appeal. If this were granted, the ultimate decision of the case would lie with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. There would be little to fear from any conclusion at which this learned body might arrive; but, meanwhile, the Canadian judges may go wrong in the affair of the appeal, as they have gone wrong according to all probability in their original decision.
Under these circumstances the application was made Last Week to the Court of Queen’s Bench here in London that a habeas corpus might issue, directed to the Governor of the Province of Canada—to the sheriff of Toronto—and to the keeper of the gaol there—commanding them to bring up the body of John Anderson, together with a statement as to the cause of his detention.
It seems to be correct law—at least we now have it upon the authority of the Chief Justice Cockburn, and the Judges of the Queen’s Bench—that such a writ may issue in the Queen’s name to Canada. Lord Mansfield had previously laid down the law upon the subject in the following words: "There is no doubt of the power of this Court where the place is under the subjection of the Crown of England. The only question is as to the propriety. To foreign dominions which belong to a Prince who succeeds to the Throne of England, this Court has no power to send a writ of any kind. We cannot send a habeas corpus to Scotland, or to the Electorate; but to Ireland, the Isle of Man, the Plantations, and (as since the loss of the Duchy of Normandy, they have been considered as annexed to the Crown in some respects) to Guernsey, and Jersey we may: and formerly it lay to Calais, which was a conquest, and yielded to the Crown by the Treaty of Bretigny.” The Chief Justice and his fellows considered Last Week that nothing short of a legislative enactment could deprive our Courts here of concurrent jurisdiction in such a matter, even where local legislatures and local Courts of Justice had been established. In the absence of such enactment it is a question of concurrent jurisdiction.
Such, then, is the way in which Anderson will be brought to England. But in considering his case we must disabuse our minds of the old honourable clap-trap about a slave’s recovery of liberty, as soon as his foot touches English soil. Anderson is not claimed by the United States under the Extradition Treaty, because he is a Fugitive Slave, but because he is a Fugitive Murderer.
The facts are, that being held in slavery in Missouri, he was endeavouring to effect his escape, but that one Digges endeavoured to interrupt his flight;—that Anderson, being otherwise unable to escape from his assailant and would-be captor, resisted with all his might, and in the course of the struggle struck Digges with some weapon, or instrument. The wound proved mortal, and Digges died. It does not appear that Digges held any special warrant for the arrest of Anderson, or that he was employed in carrying out the process of any Court when he attempted to capture Anderson. There is, however, a law in the State of Missouri which empowers, and, we believe, requires all citizens of the State to arrest any slave who may be found at a certain distance from his master’s house and plantations. Digges was acting under the authority of this municipal regulation when he endeavoured to capture Anderson, and in so doing met with his own death.
Let it not be forgotten that such is the law of