from the contest. It seems most probable that this is pretty much the history of the Slave and Free Soil parties or factions in the States at the present moment. Each is determined to play its last card in the game of “brag.” Each will adhere to the very extremest of its own demands as long as there is a chance that the other side will give in. But secession to all appearance means ruin to the great American Confederation of States—both to North and South. There is not any consequence of a war with this country which could be so dreadful to the United States as the apparently certain results of disunion. It cannot be but that when the most violent spirits have had time to exhale their angry passions, men of calmer head will step in and preserve the unity of the Confederation. The North would be simply paralysed if this secession should take place: the Southern States would lose the market for which they are contending, even whilst the dispute was in course of settlement. There would be a governing caste of white proprietors, a vast population of slaves with no work ready to their hand, inasmuch as Africa, Australia, and British India, would have been summoned to repair their deficiencies in supply. Save as caterers of cotton for the world, the Southerners could not afford to maintain the slave population—what, if the privilege of supplying cotton should slip from their grasp whilst they are asserting, with all the spirit of freemen, their inalienable right to keep the negro in slavery? Of course the matter is still doubtful, and at first sight he would appear to be a bold man who foretold a peaceful solution of this great “difficulty “; but the Americans have a way peculiar to themselves of producing storm and sunshine—and that in an instant of time. Despite of these Charlestown demonstrations, and of Mr. Buchanan’s correspondence with the deputies from the South, it will be surprising indeed if the Americans do not find some peaceful and satisfactory solution of the question. If this cannot be done by the regularly constituted authorities, at least it would seem probable that the cooler and more calculating heads in each State will devise some method of promoting their own views, without having recourse to so ruinous a step as the dissolution of the Union.
Surely this American difficulty and the position of Italian affairs are in themselves sufficient to give zest to the intelligence of Last Week. But now that the British Parliament is to be called again together in a few days, we may look a little forward, as well as a little back. Was there ever a period in the history of the British nation when, upon domestic grounds, the opening of Parliament was anticipated with such apparent indifference? It is scarcely doubtful that the grand football of Reform, which has amused rather than occupied so many Parliaments of late years, will be again produced; but the public have ceased to feel much interest in the game, for they have ceased to believe that the players are in earnest. We do not believe in Lord Palmerston’s Reform Bill more than we believed in the Reform Bill brought in under the auspices of Lord Derby. On the whole, it would appear as though, in the present threatening aspect of foreign affairs, any considerable domestic contention may stand adjourned over the ensuing Session. The British nation is not resolved to force the hands of our British statesmen—and our statesmen seem resolved not to move in the matter until their hands are actually forced. Are we to throw good money after bad, as we did last year? It would be no inconsiderable gain if, during the next six months, the Attorney-General should pass through the two Houses a good measure of Bankruptcy Reform—giving up the two clauses which were the blots upon his propositions of last year—and if the various Bills for the consolidation of our Criminal Law were to be converted into statutes. These are not measures which involve any strong political or party feeling, but, if they could be passed through Parliament, they would be of enormous advantage to the community.
Again, there is the question of British India—that splendid but ever-running sore—which must be dealt with in the course of the next few months, or at least be placed in the way of solution. The vital point of the amalgamation of the British and Indian army is still unsettled. British India is still in a bankrupt condition, and is likely to continue so for a time. It is too much to expect that all these difficulties should be settled by a legislative thunder clap; but at least, after these many years of delay, we have a right to expect that such impulses may be communicated to our Indian policy as may enable us to look forward to a day when India may be self-supporting, and cease to be a source of ever-recurring anxiety to the population of these islands. The reform of the financial system of India, and changes for the better in the arrangements of the civil service, would seem to be the turning-points of the difficulty.
India is killed by her military expenditure. The British Islands also can scarcely support the burden of maintaining the naval and military forces which are necessary for their security. Here, in Europe, we are compelled to take precautions against the ambitious designs—real or supposed—of our great neighbour; but in India, economy and good government are interchangeable terms.
Never did a British Minister enter upon a session of Parliament apparently with greater strength than the present Premier. Those, however, who have watched Lord Palmerston’s political career always feel that the hour of difficulty is his time of triumph—in over-security lies his danger. He is too apt to forget that followers must be conciliated, and public opinion respected, even when large majorities are at his back. So long as the Continental difficulties continue, he has little to fear from the rivalry of Lord John Russell—for the Foreign Secretary is content with the direction of foreign affairs. It may well happen that Mr. Gladstone may prove a more serious embarrassment, for the expenditure of the country is enormous, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, despite of his brilliant talents, does not possess the confidence of the Exchange. Lord Palmerston’s chief danger, however, lies in the difficulty of preserving moderation in the midst of seeming security.