Page:Open access and the humanities - contexts, controversies and the future.pdf/45

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
The Two Cultures
27


(4) to create a chain of verification whereby the claims upon which the new work rests can be checked. It is worth unpacking these statements so that some of the purposes of scholarly communication and ‘publication’ of research can be defined for this discussion.

The first of these points is, essentially, informational about the extant literature. Those new to a field, if presented with no preceding research, would be likely simply to replicate existing findings and arguments; their work would not be novel. By requiring reference to existing literature, a network of citations is slowly built that acts as a map of the field. The newcomer can quickly gauge the central points of a particular field by cross-correlating citations. Furthermore, the importance of an author’s works within particular niche sub-areas is revealed when a work is more frequently cited within such an area (although caution towards such a quantified ‘citation counting’ approach should be urged as measuring worth in such numerical terms is of dubious applicability to the educational enrichment provided by the humanities). In those disciplines where artistic practice forms a part of research and the output is, therefore, more akin to (or even is) art itself, reference to others serves to contextualise the work; it provides a constellation of other work within which the piece under discussion can be situated, read and understood.

The second point, of criticism and refutation, is one of public communication. As arguments or facts come under scrutiny, debate between scholars is committed to record and new understandings emerge from communication. While arguments in academia can often seem petty, the amount of research effort that goes into verifying findings (in archival work, for instance) and constructing viable arguments is substantial, so it is of little surprise that a lot is at stake for academics in these debates (Sayre’s law notwithstanding).55 Few would dispute, though, that the majority are motivated by intellectual curiosity and truth rather than malice in publicly refuting another’s work.

The third point is one of reputation and novelty.56 While this is not strictly necessary within a totally idealistic system under which people might work solely for the benefit of truth with no personal, ulterior motive, this is not the world that exists. Scholars’ reputations are positively founded and can negatively founder upon the basis of an idea that does or does not gain currency. This forms a crucial part