SOME WEAKNESSES IN THE NEWSPAPER LAW OF OREGON
By WILLIAM G. HALE, Dean of School of Law, University of Oregon
[Dean Hale read this paper at the Fourth Annual Oregon Newspaper Conference, in his capacity of special adviser to the committee on codification of the Oregon laws dealing with the press. Dean Hale expressed the opinion that present conditions do not call for an immediate attempt at codification of the Oregon newspaper laws, but that some few statutes dealing with the papers appear to require amendment.]
A YEAR ago it was my privilege to report to this Conference on some of the more important features of the law of libel. Since then, at the request of your Committee on Codification, which consists of Eric W. Allen, dean of the School of Journalism of the University of Oregon; Robert W. Sawyer, editor of the Bend Bulletin; E. A. Koen, editor of the Dallas Observer; E. E. Brodie, editor of the Oregon City Enterprise; E. B. Aldrich, editor of the Pendleton East Oregonian, and Edgar McDaniel, editor of the North Bend Harbor, I have made a further study of the law in Oregon and other jurisdictions, both common and statutory, with a view of determining whether an attempt at codification is necessary and expedient. This study, combined with a more mature consideration of the whole question of codification, has led me to the conclusion that such a step is not called for by present exigencies and in addition is for the present open to some objections on grounds of policy.
My investigation reveals, first, that the law of libel has not proved especially burdensome to the newspapers of this state. In the entire history of the state only six cases against newspapers have reached the Supreme Court and in all of them the rules announced are free from ambiguity and are in accord with those laid down by a large majority of the courts in other jurisdictions. It is true that some of the rules are not as favorable to the newspapers as they might wish. In Upton v. Hume (24 Or. 420), for example, it is held that misstatements of defamatory facts concerning candidates for office are not qualifiedly privileged and hence that proof of the truth of the charges constitutes the only legal justification. This doctrine is open to question on principle and is not approved by all courts.[1] It is however in accord with the great weight of authority elsewhere, has much sound argument back of it and would most certainly receive full support by members of the legislature and other men in political life. Any attempt to change it, therefore, would probably be inexpedient.
It is also true that some questions over which other jurisdictions have been in dispute have not arisen for adjudication in Oregon. But on these questions likewise it is somewhat doubtful if rules could be formulated that would be at once acceptable to the newspapers and to the legislature and public.
Moreover, it is quite possible that, if issues were once raised in the form of a bill, the legislature would reverse the rules offered by the news paper proprietors, thus making their latter and worse, if anything, than the beginning.
Finally it may be pointed out that no program will succeed that appears to
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- ↑ See Coleman v. Maclennan, 78 Kansas 711, which holds that defamatory statements concerning a candidate for public office are qualifiedly privileged, and hence that the newspaper is legally exonerated if they were made in good faith. This case contains the best discussion available in support of this view. For the full presentation of the majority view see Starr Pub. Co. v. Donahue, (Delaware, 1904) 58 Atlantic Reporter, 513.
