THE FEDERAL RELATIONS
OF OREGON
179
if one came, to the Senate, which would undoubtedly him to accept it, were not upon the surface then. Even members of his Cabinet were still a little uncertain of the
mise offer, advise
situation, and, except for those Senators with whom Polk talked freely and to whom he had stated that he would submit In a proposition to the Senate, Congress was wholly at sea.
was going on in the House was quiescent for the moment, although early in was in the forefront again. The war spirit had some-
the Senate the debate on the notice the topic
March
it
what subsided, however. The threatened change of ministry in England, which would have given Palmerston the Foreign Office, had not taken place and men felt that Aberdeen could be counted on to pursue a pacific course as long as he was 14 Nevertheless there was general given half an opportunity. unanimity in the belief that things must go on and be settled; the problem must be solved and giving notice was the first step on the American side. 15 Before McLane received an answer to his suggestion he wrote again, 16 following an interview with Lord Aberdeen, that the United States could not expect the British government to accept anything less than 49 degrees to the sea and free navigation of the Columbia for the Hudson's Bay Company for a period of years. If it should be found that the Columbia was not navigable at the point where it was crossed by the forty-ninth parallel this point would probably not be He reiterated his belief that no proposition insisted upon. of any sort would come until the notice had been acted upon in Congress. The same day he wrote Calhoun to much the same effect, although here he stated that he believed the British government, despite repeated refusals, still had some notion that the United States would ultimately agree to arbitration. 14 For instance the letters of Webster, Calhoun, Ingersoll and others review; there would be peace, although fust how they could not tell. Yet Poinsett wrote Van Buren, 2 Mar., (Vari Buren Papers, Vol. 53) : "I very R. J. much fear our foreign relations are becoming too complicated for the management of those, who now direct them, to be disentangled without war." 15 Buchanan analyzed the situation in a letter to McLane, 26 Feb., Works, d, *>dW VI, 385-7. I 16 To Buchanan, 3 Mar., No. West Bound, Arb.; to Calhoun, Correspondence of Calhoun, 1076-9. flect this
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