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its forces tor an active or passive resistance to the revolution. Moreover it may be taken for granted that at the moment when the class-war breaks out, the Government will know how to arrange the external situation as favourably as possible according to its needs, will, if possible, have sought help from outside, or in any case will have made ready in the rear against any attack coming from inside the frontier. In November the bourgeois class of Finland would have had more trouble in obtaining help from the German Government than they subsequently had in winter, when the German troops had beau withdrawn from the Russian from—but it was difficult for us to foresee this in November, or for that matter in January as well.

(2). We Centre Social-Democrats did not wish to form a "bloc" with the bourgeois "Liberals," although the Right S.-D.'s, those who were for, equally with those who were against tho revolution, looked upon it as desirable. With some sort of "entente" it is desirable. With some sort of "entente" of this kind, it was scarcely to he hoped that the aim which was floating before the eyes of the "Centrist" S.-D.'s could be realised, i.e., the formation of a Liberal Government whose members should be in great part Socialists, and whose programme should be the alleviation of tho food famine and tho adoption of a hundred different reforms through Parliamentary methods. That several Agrarians might be included as a sort of reinforcement in a "Red" Senate constituted by "revolutionary means" was looked upon favourably by the Right S.-D.'s. With this in view, the S.-D. group of the Diet, during the week of the general strike, held several conferences with the Agrarian Party, and probably also with certain other Liberal groups, and "Comrade" Tokoi made inquiries as to whether the Senate officials would remain at their posts under a "Red Senate." Thus the object of the "revolutionary" S.-D.'s was in reality to reform the spring Coalition Senate in a more thorough way than before, i. e., with a S.-D. majority, and leaving eventually the worst reactionaries out of account altogether.

Viewing the matter in the most favourable light, this result might well have been obtained by the revolution in November. Nothing more. Finnish Social-Democracy could have gained nothing else. One section of the workers would