cated that no enemy reinforcements were reaching the Buna-Sanananda area. The enemy was apparently concentrating all his available naval, air, and land strength on the battle then raging in the Solomons. If he could drive us from Guadalcanal and advance southward to cut our supply line to Australia, his relative neglect of New Guinea would be justified. On the other hand, determined action on our part might crush the enemy in the Papuan Peninsula and so remove permanently the Japanese threat to Port Moresby.
General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area; General Sir Thomas Blamey, Commander of Allied Land Forces, Southwest Pacific Area and General Officer Commanding New Guinea Force; and Lt. Gen. E. F. Herring, General Officer Commanding Advanced New Guinea Force, all of whom were at Port Moresby, laid their plans accordingly. While the Australians continued to drive the enemy back along the Kokoda trail, the 32d Division under General Harding would make a secret, wide envelopment to the east and attack in force on the enemy left flank in the vicinity of Buna. This move might cut off the retreat of the main Japanese force facing the Australians. To insure speed and to avoid dissipating the strength of the division by marching it across the exhausting mountain trails, most of the enveloping force was to go by air to the seacoast southeast of Buna.
During the remainder of October and the early part of November, the 126th Infantry and the 128th Infantry were moving into position. Acting as left-flank guard, the 2d Battalion of the 126th Infantry crossed the lofty Owen Stanley Mountains on foot by a rugged trail rising over 8,000 feet. On 20 November, after an exceedingly difficult march of 5 weeks, they reached Soputa. The 128th Infantry on 14–18 October was flown to the hastily improved air strip at Wanigela Mission on Collinwood Bay, 65 air miles from Buna. From Wanigela small 20-ton motor launches carried the regiment up the coast to Pongani, 23 miles from Buna, where it halted to construct a landing strip. The 126th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion and part of the 1st Battalion, went directly by air to this new strip on 9–11 November.
While our troops were concentrating toward Buna, reconnaissance was limited in order to secure the maximum of surprise when the force attacked. However, Australian patrols operating to our front learned early in November that "bush wireless" had carried the news of our
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