Page:Parker v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.pdf/15

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Ark.]
Parker v. Southern Farm Bureau Ins. Co.
Cite as 326 Ark. 1073 (1996)
1087


should be commensurate with the time and amount of work involved, and the ability present and necessary to meet the issues that arise in the case. Furthermore, the amount recovered in the action is a relevant consideration.

[11] In Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heslip, 309 Ark. 319, 832 S.W.2d 463 (1992), this court affirmed a $19,500 fee on a $36,000 award pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-208. The court outlined the following factors as relevant in the determination of the fee: 1) experience and ability of the attorney; 2) time and labor required to perform the service properly; 3) amount involved and the result obtained in the case; 4) novelty and difficulty of the issues involved; 5) the fee customarily charged for similar services in the locality; 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) the time limitations imposed upon the client in the circumstances; and 8) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. Id.

In the present case, Parker submitted a detailed bill for 117.60 total hours. While it is virtually impossible to separate those services related to the coverage claim and those related to the bad faith claim, the large amount of the fee in relation to Parker's recovery is obvious, and we have said that the amount recovered is a proper consideration.

Farm Bureau expresses policy concerns that other attorneys will bring frivolous bad-faith claims in coverage cases in order to recover a larger fee. Parker replies that because this was a relatively small claim, the conduct of Farm Bureau was especially egregious, and that the larger fee should be upheld in order to encourage competent attorneys to take on such small cases.

[12] The trial court, in its order, considered these and all of the relevant factors presented in this case. We cannot say that there was an abuse of discretion in the award of the fee.

Affirmed on appeal and affirmed on cross-appeal.

Special Justice ELTON A. RIEVES, III, joins in this opinion.

JESSON, C.J., and DUDLEY, J., not participating.

GLAZE, J., concurring.

BROWN, J., and Special Justice MICHAEL E. STUBBLEFIELD,