Cite as 326 Ark. 1073 (1996)
matters, we have found an abuse of discretion where there has been an undue limitation of substantial rights of the appellant under the prevailing circumstances. Rickett v. Hayes, 251 Ark. 395, 473 S.W.2d 446 (1971). A motion for production of documents must be considered in the light of the particular circumstances which give rise to it, and the need of the movant for the information requested. Marrow, supra.
[2] Parker is correct in his assertion that in cases where the appellant is relegated to having to prove his claim by documents, papers, and letters kept by the appellee, the scope of discovery should be broader. Marrow v. State Farm Ins. Co., 264 Ark. 227, 570 S.W.2d 607 (1978). We consider this factor in deciding whether there has been an abuse of discretion in denying a discovery request. Id. The goal of discovery is to permit a litigant to obtain whatever information he may need to prepare adequately for issues that may develop without imposing an onerous burden on his adversary. Id.
In Marrow, this court held that the appellant's discovery had been unduly limited, finding it significant that the appellant was in the position of having to prove his fraud case by the testimony of officers and agents of the insurance company, and by documents, papers, and letters, written and kept by the insurance company. That the information sought was not otherwise available to the party making the request, and that evidence pertaining to the issue, if there was any, would likely be in the files of the insurance company were said to be "very pertinent circumstances." Id.
Clearly, the general principles articulated in Marrow are applicable to a claim of bad faith. However, the materials held discoverable in Marrow were directly related to the insurance claim at issue, and we stated in Marrow that this court has never sanctioned "an outright and unadulterated fishing expedition."
Moreover, the fact remains that during the course of discovery Farm Bureau provided Parker with substantial information and material regarding the billing and notice procedures. Virtually all of the discovered evidence and deposition testimony corroborated Farm Bureau's position that it did, in fact, have a dual billing-notice system with regard to what it defined as "clean billing," as opposed to other billing situations involving a change in the policies. The trial court found this evidence significant in issuing the protective order for the notices.
