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48 The appellant contended that the express statutory exhortation to a decision-maker to perform a function "in as timely a manner as is possible" is exceptional and emphasises the legislative intention that reviews should be completed without undue delay. He submitted that the language is only used when the Parliament wishes to place emphasis on expedition.

49 The respondent submitted that, to the contrary, the exhortation to conduct an IC review "in as timely a manner as is possible" does not require the pursuit of timeliness at the expense of the proper administration of the FOI Act or the proper consideration of the issues arising in a particular IC review. It was submitted that those issues include the application of exemptions directed to protection of important public interests. It was noted that the expression used in s 55(4)(c) is "in as timely a manner as is possible given the matters mentioned in subparagraphs (a)(i) to (iii)", which contemplates consideration of what is practical having regard to those specified matters (being the requirements of the Act, the requirements of any other law, and a proper consideration of the matters before the Information Commissioner).

50 So much may readily be accepted. Contrary to the appellant's submission, the terms of s 55(4)(c), read in context, are not properly characterised as emphasising "expedition" in the sense the appellant contends, namely that the reviews must be completed without undue delay. No time limit has been imposed, in contrast to an FOI application: s 15(5)(b) of the FOI Act. Rather, Parliament chose aspirational language in the provision to be considered within a broad framework. This approach recognises that the practical application of the IC review process and need for a proper consideration of the specific matter exist together with an applicant's interest in the timely outcome of the process.

51 The appellant was at pains to stress that s 55(4)(c) is "exceptional", despite the respondent pointing to provisions in similar terms in other statutes: see, e.g., Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) at ss 82L(1), 83ED(2) and 83EE(1). In any event, the statutory context highlighted by the respondent demonstrates that timeliness is a competing, rather than an overriding, priority.

52 We also note that s 55(4) is not intended to limit s 55(2), which provides that the Information Commissioner may conduct the IC review in whatever way they consider appropriate, use any technique they consider appropriate to facilitate an agreed resolution, allow a person to participate in a review by any means of communication, obtain any information from any person and make any inquiries considered appropriate, and to give written directions as to the conduct of reviews.


Patrick v Australian Information Commissioner [2024] FCAFC 93
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