In his clear and convincing analysis of the situ-
ation created by the gradual formation in secret,
of these relationships, Lord Loreburn brings out
the following points : Through the communica-
tions with the French Ambassador and military
and naval conversations concerning plans for
joint action, France was encouraged more and
more to expect that Great Britain would stand
by her in arms if she were attacked by Germany.
Such a policy of a defensive understanding with
France, no matter how right in itself, was obvi-
ously a new departure of tremendous importance.
Its execution and effectiveness could be assured
only if understood by Parliament as a national
policy, with all the risks involved, so that proper
preparations could be made. Parliament was,
however, never warned of the danger England
stood of being thrown suddenly into a European
war. Had Germany been told in July, 1914, that
Great Britain would support France and Russia,
the war would undoubtedly have been prevented;
but while the ministers had in fact incurred moral
obligations over against France, they had not as-
sured themselves of the necessary Parliamentary
support and could therefore not make a statement
involving such risk as the above declaration to
Germany would have created.
