ments, perhaps as frequently as in England, but there was no real mutual influence between the nation and the officials conducting foreign affairs. As has already been pointed out, German diplo- macy failed to reassure either the neighbors or the people of Germany; its lack of clear objectives was puzzling and disquieting. It was also hurt by its constant, evident dependence on what should have been only the very last resort mili- tary force. A further disquieting characteristic of German politics was that there seemed to be a cynical approval of certain courses of action which might indeed resemble what some other na- tions were doing, but which were treated by the latter rather as regrettable necessities. Thus there is, for instance, the conception of Recdpoli- tik, of which Frederick the Great's statement is an extreme instance: "Before declaring my in- tentions I consider on the one side the adverse incidents which I must risk; on the other, the good fortune which I might hope; and after thorough consideration of pro and con, I decide for war." Coming now to the fateful crisis of 1914, it would appear that at this time a great danger was allowed to grow up without the men in con- trol of the government giving themselves a full account as to the fatal probabilities involved,
