archy into this war, while it appeared doubtful to him that the aged and peace-loving Emperor Fran- cis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany on any other occasion where the action would center less round him, he wished to make use of the Ser- vian episode so as to be sure of Austria-Hungary in the decisive' struggle. That was his policy, and not Bethmann's. ... I am persuaded, how- ever, that Tschirsky, in behaving as he did, widely overstretched his prescribed sphere of activity. Isvolsky was not the only one of his kind."
It is not the purpose of this essay to enter into the difficult question of the specific guilt for bring- ing on the war of 1914, However, in examining the quality and methods of contemporary diplo- macy it is not possible to avoid considering some of the phases of this difficult question. The docu- ments and other evidence which have recently been published, make it appear that Bethmann- Hollweg, when the terrible crisis was actually at hand, honestly attempted to bring about a mod- eration of the course pursued by Austria. The original belief of the German statesman itself could, however, be accounted for, only on one of two alternative reasons, either because of an un- believable lack of foresight, or the conviction that a threatening attitude would again, as in 1909, be
