grounds his 'Sherlock Holmes' stories are presented as factual accounts by Dr. Watson." 1 Nimmer § 2.11[C] at 2-172.22; see also Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 516, 526 n.52 (1981) ("The Oliver case is particularly bizarre, even under California's expansive view of the normal. The defendant was permitted to appropriate material appearing in plaintiff's work because it had been represented as the actual revelations of a deceased entity from another world. It would appear, however, that the interests of society would not suffer greatly if this position were tempered by the adoption of an objective measure of the reasonable expectations of the copier.")
These significant distinctions mitigate against a finding of estoppel based on Plaintiffs' representations that the Course was authored by Jesus. As a matter of law, it is irrelevant for copyright purposes whether Jesus wrote the Course. There is no question, of course, that if Schucman had been a "scribe" for Thetford (for example), she would lack the requisite originality for copyright protection. But she was not a scribe for any human creator. She was a scribe for a voice she heard in her own mind. While she identified this voice as "Jesus," and Plaintiffs, Defendants, and countless other people have apparently chosen to believe this, beliefs are not substitutes for facts. They cannot
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