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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| Bien Phu ($1.2 million) which included 8 tanks, 24 howitzers, and 15,000 small arms. Defense Letter to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 14 December 1954 | 818 | |
| 227. | Collins is convinced that "Diem does not have the capacity to unify divided factions in Vietnam" and unless decisive action or dramatic leadership galvanizes the country into unified action "this country will be lost to communism. "Apparently, the only Vietnamese who might be competent is Bao Dai." It is recommended that the U.S. not assume responsibility for training on 1 January 1955, or give direct military aid. Collins 2303 for Dulles, 16 December 1954 | 820 |
| 228. | Ambassador Heath suggests that General Collins' recommendations ignore the basic factor that withholding aid from Diem would assist a communist takeover. Dulles has analyzed our situation in Vietnam as a "time buying operation" and Heath recommends continued support of Diem in spite of a "Bao Dai solution." The fear that $300 million plus our national prestige would be lost in a gamble" is a legitimate one, but withholding our support would "have a far worse effect." Heath Memorandum to FE, 17 December 1954 | 824 |
| 229. | Tripartite discussions on Indochina are summarized. To Secretary Dulles desire to continue strong support of Diem, Ely indicates that he and Collins have exerted pressure without result and "were now convinced that it was hopeless to expect anything of Diem." Ely feels that he and Collins must decide now "whether Diem was really the man capable of national union." Four points are agreed up on: (1) support Diem, (2) study alternatives, (3) investigate timing of replacement, and (4) (added by Dulles) how much more U.S. investment should be made in Indochina if it is decided there is no good alternative to Diem? Paris 2601 to State, 19 December 1954 | 826 |
| 230. | The President approves NSC 5429/4 as amended and adopted by the Council as NSC 5429/5. This statement on current U.S. policy in the Far East deals with the primary problem of the threat to U.S. security resulting from communist expansion in China, Korea, and North Vietnam. NSC 5429/5, 22 December 1954 | 835 |
| 231. | Dulles spells out guidelines for future U.S. actions in Indochina: (1) we must create such a situation |
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