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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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4448, APRIL 9, 10 PM. (SECTION TWO OF FIVE),
FROM SAIGON

such notification, he will call on me to find out what information I have and perhaps to ask for advice. I would propose replying that I had been notified by my government of decision of Bao Dai, and would seek to persuade Diem to remain in office until his successor could take over. We should be willing to assist him in preparing a statement which he might issue as indicated in paragraph 2a above.

4. Reach agreement between U.S., France, and new president on program for solution of sect political and military problems. It is believed that an agreement would have to be reached between Ely, the new president, and myself, on a program for solution of the political and military problems of the sects. This would require a prior agreement between French and U.S. governments along the lines of our proposals contained in embassy telegram 4373. These proposals are being actively studied now by General Ely's staff. We expect to come to agreement here within 48 hours. Approval will still be required from Washington, particularly as to added costs which are involved in the induction of more sect personnel than originally countemplated, severance pay for sect personnel to be demobilized, and larger average strength of armed forces for FY 1955, caused by slow down in discharge of Vietnamese army personnel as a result of present sect crisis.

5. Obtain agreement of sects to proposed solution of their problems.

A. Next step would probably be for new president to meet with leaders of sects and obtain their agreement to solution arrived at under paragraph 4 above. He would have to make clear to sects that this was best program they could possibly obtain and that it was only way to continue American and French financial and moral support, without which the country could not possibly be saved from Viet Minh and communism which sects profess to detest.

B. It is our thought that sects would not be invited to participate in cabinet, except for possibly one or two men, who might be chosen because of their ability rather than as

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