Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/252

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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-2- 4448, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

reforms for his country.

B. Perhaps it was inevitable that implementation of these programs would develop devisive influences among the people of Vietnam, who have only recently gained their independence. They have had little experience in meeting the complex problems which they face, such as reconciling different interests of sects and various regions of the country. This has resulted in clashes of personality, which had much to do with the current crisis, involving the 'unified front" organization. Resultant bloodshed, even though not extensive, has created deep wounds which will be difficult for present government to heal.

C. Diem was unable or unwilling to take into his government members of various opposition parties. Only with broad support can the progressive programs developed by Diem be made effective. The new government is headed by a man who has had experience in government and whose personality is such that he should be able to get other strong men to work with him. He has adopted the same basic programs which Diem initiated and which have the full support of both U.S. and France. Decision as to who should head government of Vietnam is, of course, one to be made by the Vietnamese people under their own system. While change in presidency involves temporary loss to Vietnam of a great nationalist leader, it does not in any sense mean a change in the policies of his government which have drawn U.S. support. With this support and the cooperation of all elements of Vietnam, the country can be saved from communism.

KIDDER


LFS/32


Note: Read by Mr. Yound (PSA) 2:30. p.m. 4/9/55 FMH

906


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