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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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4662, APRIL 19, 11 P.M,
FROM SAIGON

opinion and creating an atmosphere in which Sects can be induced accept peaceful solution. Problem could have been resolved more easily at an earlier time. Quat said he did not think Diem and any team he might gather could resume effective contact with Sects.

4. Quat discussed in a generally unfavorable sense Do's idea of having Bao Dai convoke a congress. He said the congress would be more quickly set up than a provisional assembly and would be more manageable. However, owing to Bao Dai's absence in France, present political roles of Sects and attitude of other political groups, he believed congress not practicable. Quat said he though the best solution would be provided by a provisional assembly, but political groups are fearful of any assembly constituted under Diem as Prime Minister.

5. Do said that in his view means should be found to allow Vietnamese public opinion to be heard. He had suggested congress as a means to that end. If there were an assembly present, crisis could be more easily resolved. A congress, operating under Binh Xuyen menace, might remove Diem and this could be interpreted as vicotry for Sects with unfortunate effects in U.S. Do suggested as possibility that congress be representative only of political groups and not repeat not of Sects. If provisional assembly solution were adopted, it would be necessary find interim government to function for period of perhaps six weeks and thus problem remains of creating a new government. Diem is a barrier to solution of this problem. Do referred to fact that during nine years of war no government could obtain popular support for struggle against Communism because they were all French puppet governments. Problem now is to gain popular support to continue resistance to Viet Minh. Diem's government has not succeeded in convincing people or political groups of necessity to carry on anti-Viet Minh struggle. Only a government fully supported by people can do that, and such a government must come from some kind of popular body, either an assembly or a congress. As a practical test of whether provisional government followed by provisional assembly would be acceptable solution, Do suggested asking specific individuals, such as Quat and Minh, whether they

would
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