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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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1960 Page
294. The evolution of political conditions necessitates that policy guidance should be directed at the problem of dealing with Sihanouk of Cambodia, "by all odds the major single factor in Cambodia and the principal target of U.S. policy." Further, the guidance of NSC 5809 is not adequate to cope with the situation in Laos. OCB Special Report on Southeast Asia, 10 February 1960 1249
295. The Vietnam Country Team prepares a special report on the current security situation in Vietnam. "…the rural population is generally apathetic towards the Diem Government and there are signs of considerable dissatisfaction and silent opposition." Without support of the rural population, no final solution can be found to the internal security problem. Militarily, the GVN organization lacks unity of command. The situation is summed up. "…the government has tended to treat the population with suspicion or to coerce it and has been rewarded with an attitude of apathy or resentment." Saigon 278 to State, 7 March 1960 1254
296. Williams testified that he was working "MAAG out of a job" and this is impressive to Senator Mansfield and the Foreign Relations Committee. Mansfield requests information on the situation which now requires "the addition of 350 men to the MAAG." Mansfield Letter to Lt General Williams, 5 May 1960 1276
297. Williams replies that the 350 spaces referred to are the TERM personnel now in deactivation. The turnover of TERM spaces to MAAG ends the "subterfuge as actually TERM has had the undercover mission as logistical advisers since activation." Williams MAGCH-CH91 to OSD (for Mansfield), 20 May 1960 1279
298. The President approves changes in NSC 5809 and directs implementation as NSC 6012, "U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia." Policies toward Vietnam are essentially unchanged. NSC 6012, 25 July 1960 1281
299. Developments in South Vietnam indicate an adverse trend end if they remain unchanged will almost certainly cause the collapse of President Diem's regime. SNIE 63 1-60, 23 August 1960 1298
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